Supreme Court Oral Arguments

• [24-556] Fernandez v. United States

  Fernandez v. United States Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 12, 2025. Petitioner: Joe Fernandez.Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: Benjamin Gruenstein (for the Petitioner) Eric J. Feigin (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Joe Fernandez participated as a backup shooter in a 2000 murder-for-hire scheme in the Bronx. On February 22, 2000, Patrick Darge hired him to help kill Arturo Cuellar and Idelfonso Vivero Flores, two Mexican drug cartel members who had come to New York City to collect approximately $6.5 million owed by drug trafficker Jeffrey Minaya for 274 kilograms of cocaine. When Darge's gun jammed after shooting Cuellar in the head, Fernandez fired fourteen shots in the apartment building lobby, nine hitting the victims. He received $40,000 for his participation. After eleven years on the run, Fernandez surrendered to police in October 2011. Unlike his co-defendants who pleaded guilty and cooperated with the government, Fernandez proceeded to trial in 2013. The government's key witness was Patrick Darge, who admitted during cross-examination to lying to authorities in previous cases. Despite this admission, the jury convicted Fernandez of participating in a murder-for-hire conspiracy resulting in two deaths and aiding and abetting the use of a firearm to commit murder during a crime of violence. In October 2014, he received a mandatory life sentence, while his cooperating co-defendants received significantly lighter sentences: Darge (30 years), Reyes (25 years), Minaya (15 years), and Rivera (2 years). The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York originally sentenced Fernandez, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed his conviction on direct appeal in 2016. In 2021, the district court vacated one of his convictions but left the mandatory life sentence intact. When Fernandez filed a compassionate release motion citing his possible innocence and sentencing disparity, the district court granted it in 2022, but the Second Circuit reversed this decision. Question Can a federal prisoner use the compassionate release law to get their sentence reduced based on claims that they might be innocent or that their sentence is unfair, even though these same claims would normally have to be raised through habeas corpus?

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• [24-820] Rutherford v. United States

  Rutherford v. United States Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 12, 2025. Petitioner: Daniel Rutherford.Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: David C. Frederick (for the Petitioner in No. 24-820) David A. O'Neil (for the Petitioner in No. 24-860) Eric J. Feigin (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2003, twenty-two-year-old Daniel Rutherford committed two armed robberies at a Pennsylvania chiropractic office within a five-day period. During the first robbery, he brandished a gun at the chiropractor and stole $390 and a watch. Four days later, he returned to the same office with an accomplice, again pulled a gun, and stole $900 in cash and jewelry. A jury convicted Rutherford of one count of conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, two counts of Hobbs Act robbery, and two counts of using a firearm during a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The district court sentenced Rutherford to 125 months for the robbery-related charges plus mandatory consecutive sentences of 7 years for the first § 924(c) offense and 25 years for the second, totaling nearly 42.5 years in prison. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed his conviction in 2007, and he did not appeal his sentence. In 2021, Rutherford filed a motion for compassionate release, arguing that changes in federal sentencing law would result in a significantly shorter sentence if he were sentenced today. The district court denied his motion in 2023, and the Third Circuit affirmed the lower court’s denial. Question May a district court, when evaluating a motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), consider as an “extraordinary and compelling reason” the fact that a defendant is serving a sentence substantially longer than what would be imposed today due to the First Step Act’s prospective changes to mandatory minimum penalties, particularly where the disparity amounts to decades of additional imprisonment?

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• [23-1197] Landor v. LA DOC

  Landor v. Louisiana Department of Corrections Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 10, 2025. Petitioner: Damon Landor.Respondent: Louisiana Department of Corrections and Public Safety. Advocates: Zachary D. Tripp (for the Petitioner) Libby A. Baird (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner) J. Benjamin Aguinaga (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Damon Landor, a devout Rastafarian, vowed as part of his faith never to cut his hair—a religious commitment known as the Nazarite Vow. Incarcerated in 2020, Landor was first held at the St. Tammany Parish Detention Center and later at LaSalle Correctional Center, both of which allowed him to maintain his hairstyle in accordance with his religious beliefs. After approximately five months and with three weeks left in his sentence, Landor was transferred to Raymond Laborde Correctional Center. Upon arrival, Landor proactively explained his religious practices and presented documentation of previous accommodations, including a copy of a federal court decision supporting similar claims. An intake guard disregarded his documentation, summoned the warden, and upon Landor’s inability to produce immediate additional proof of his beliefs, guards forcibly handcuffed Landor and shaved his head. Following his release, Landor sued the Louisiana Department of Corrections and Public Safety, its Secretary James LeBlanc, the correctional center, and Warden Marcus Myers, asserting claims under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his federal constitutional rights, as well as state law claims. The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana dismissed Landor’s individual-capacity RLUIPA claims for money damages, holding such relief unavailable under controlling Fifth Circuit precedent. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, relying on its prior decision in Sossamon v. Lone Star State of Texas, and rejecting Landor’s arguments that subsequent Supreme Court authority or other legal developments altered that result. Question May an individual sue a government official in his individual capacity for damages for violations of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA)?

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• [24-758] The GEO Group, Inc. v. Menocal

  The GEO Group, Inc. v. Menocal Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 10, 2025. Petitioner: The GEO Group, Inc.Respondent: Alejandro Menocal. Advocates: Dominic E. Draye (for the Petitioner) Jennifer D. Bennett (for the Respondents) Sopan Joshi (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Alejandro Menocal and other immigration detainees brought a class action lawsuit against The GEO Group, Inc. (GEO), a private company that operates the Aurora Immigration Processing Center (AIPC) in Colorado under contract with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). GEO maintained a mandatory Sanitation Policy requiring all detainees to clean common areas including walls, floors, bathrooms, and recreation yards. Detainees who refused these cleaning assignments faced escalating disciplinary actions, beginning with suspension of television and phone privileges and potentially resulting in solitary confinement for up to seventy-two hours. Menocal, detained from June to September 2014, witnessed fellow detainees placed in isolation for refusing to clean, and multiple detainees testified to being threatened with or actually placed in solitary confinement for noncompliance. Additionally, AIPC operated a Voluntary Work Program where detainees could work up to eight hours daily in various jobs such as food preparation, barbering, and laundry services for compensation of $1.00 per day. Menocal filed suit in October 2014, alleging forced labor under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act for the mandatory cleaning program and unjust enrichment under Colorado common law for the $1.00 daily wage in the Voluntary Work Program. The U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado certified two classes in 2017, which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed in 2018. Following discovery, GEO moved for summary judgment claiming derivative sovereign immunity under Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Construction Co. The district court denied GEO's motion in October 2022, finding that ICE neither directed nor required GEO to compel detainee labor or limit compensation to $1.00 per day. GEO appealed this denial to the Tenth Circuit, which dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction. Question Is an order denying a government contractor’s claim of derivative sovereign immunity immediately appealable under the collateral-order doctrine?

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• [24-1287] Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump

  Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 5, 2025. Petitioner: Learning Resources, Inc., et al.Respondent: Donald J. Trump, President of the United States, et al. Advocates: D. John Sauer (for the federal parties) Neal Kumar Katyal (for the private parties) Benjamin Gutman (for the state parties) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Learning Resources, Inc. and hand2mind, Inc. are family-owned businesses that design and distribute educational products for children. Although their product development and some assembly occur domestically, most of their manufacturing is outsourced to international partners, including China. Beginning in early 2025, a series of executive orders from President Donald J. Trump, invoking the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”), imposed unprecedented tariffs on imports, including goods from China. These included a 20% “trafficking” tariff and additional “reciprocal” tariffs that pushed rates on Chinese goods to over 145%. Petitioners’ imports were directly affected, and complying with the new tariffs would increase their import-related costs from $2.3 million in 2024 to over $100 million in 2025, putting their businesses at existential risk. The petitioners filed suit on April 22, 2025, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, challenging the legality of the IEEPA tariffs. The district court granted a preliminary injunction on May 29, 2025, holding that IEEPA does not authorize the president to impose tariffs and finding that the tariffs posed an existential threat to the petitioners. However, that ruling was stayed just days later, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit docketed the case. Meanwhile, the U.S. Court of International Trade ruled similarly in related cases but its decision was also stayed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.   Question Does the International Emergency Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (“IEEPA”), authorize the president to impose tariffs?  

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