Eastern Front #9 Hitler’s Orders vs Reality: Chaos on the Eastern Front
Last time we spoke about the how Hitler’s summer triumph turned bitter. Initially buoyed by early victories, the Wehrmacht, led by General Fedor von Bock, aimed to capture Moscow by encircling the critical city of Smolensk. However, under the leadership of Marshal Semyon Timoshenko, the Red Army mounted an unexpectedly resilient defense. Despite suffering heavy losses, Soviet forces regrouped and undertook strategic reforms, relocating factories to enhance their production of tanks and aircraft. The situation intensified on July 15 as intense battles erupted in Smolensk, with German troops managing to encircle the city. Still, the Red Army's tenacity began to emerge. As the Germans celebrated capturing Smolensk on July 16, the broader picture reflected a grim reality; their supply lines stretched thin, and casualties mounted. Amidst shifting dynamics, the Red Army showcased formidable spirit and adaptability, hinting at a turning point in the war. Though Smolensk fell, the fierce resistance and evolving tactics foreshadowed challenges to come for the Wehrmacht, revealing the struggle and determination of those fighting on the Eastern Front.
This episode is the Hitler’s Orders vs Reality: Chaos on the Eastern Front
Well hello there, welcome to the Eastern Front week by week podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.
As August 1941 unfolds, the once-unshakeable illusion of a swift German victory begins to show signs of fracture. In this ninth podcast of our Eastern Front Week-by-Week series, the Wehrmacht finds itself in a precarious position, trapped between encircled Soviet forces and a resilient Red Army that refuses to succumb to defeat. At Smolensk, a significant city located in western Russia, the Soviets defy expectations by reopening the encirclement just days after it had been sealed. This audacious maneuver compels the German panzer groups, renowned for their rapid mobility, to delay their much-needed rest and refitting. The harsh reality of warfare sets in, as the promised quick victory turns into a struggle against the relentless Soviet defenders. To the south, the Uman encirclement, a brutal confrontation in Ukraine, concludes with staggering losses for the Soviet forces. While the Germans achieve a tactical victory, the cost in terms of men and resources begins to mount alarmingly for the invaders. The expansive fields of Ukraine become a graveyard for both sides, with each loss fueling the fires of conflict. Meanwhile, the Red Army is not standing idle. They mobilize millions of personnel from their vast reserves, forming new field armies even as their older counterparts are systematically dismantled on the battlefield. This resilience is a testament to the Soviet spirit, embodying their commitment to defending their homeland against the Axis onslaught. In the northern sector, Army Group North prepares for a decisive push toward Leningrad, the jewel city in the east, known for its historical and cultural significance. The forces commit their remaining strength in a desperate, last-ditch effort to seize this vital urban center. The stakes are incredibly high, as the city holds not only military importance but also symbolic value in the hearts of the Russian people.
While the German offensive strength was increasingly waning, the Soviet Union launched one of the most remarkable mobilization programs in military history. During much of the 1920s and 1930s, the Red Army developed an extensive cadre system, which maintained a small number of active-duty soldiers during peacetime but could be rapidly expanded by reservists in times of war. To support this system, the Universal Military Service Law of 1938 extended the age of enlistment for army reserves to 50 years old and established numerous new military schools to accommodate the influx of trainees. By the eve of the German invasion, the Red Army had built a mobilization base of 14 million men. By the end of June 1941, approximately 5.3 million reservists had been called up, with further mobilizations occurring in rapid succession. This cadre system allowed for an extraordinary rate of force generation, effectively outmaneuvering German intelligence estimates and obscuring the true strength of the Soviet military. In July 1941, no fewer than 13 new field armies were formed, followed by an additional 14 in August. Although these newly constituted reserve armies were not as well equipped or trained as the professional soldiers they replaced, the changing tide of warfare began to favor them as German mobile forces weakened. As the conflict transitioned to positional warfare, these new armies had the opportunity to improve their training and tactics.
While it is essential not to trivialize the scale of the military disaster experienced on the Western Front in Belorussia, it remains true that the Soviet Union's force generation scheme allowed for quick replenishment of its losses and a dramatic expansion of the Red Army's size. On June 22, 1941, the Red Army numbered 5,373,000 men; by August 31, despite suffering significant losses, this figure had grown to 6,889,000, and by December 31, 1941, the army reached an estimated eight million personnel. After the war, German military leaders, such as General Fritz Blumentritt, acknowledged the fundamental issue of latent Soviet military strength. Reflecting on the German offensive plans aimed at encircling and destroying the Red Army before they could regroup behind the Dnepr and Dvina rivers, Blumentritt posed a haunting rhetorical question: "But what if armies, millions strong, had not yet even been mobilized and only parts of the Red Army were in western Russia?" While the Soviet loss of tanks proved acutely felt, given that tanks were harder to replace, many historians have overstated the extent of German successes. At the onset of the war, the Soviet tank inventory numbered an impressive 23,767 tanks; however, this total reflected Soviet production dating back to the 1920s and included many models that had become obsolete on the modern battlefield. Of this number, around 15,000 tanks were from older T-26 and BT series, with estimates suggesting that the majority were in dire need of repair.
Moreover, untrained crews, severe shortages of ammunition, fuel, and spare parts, as well as the absence of supporting arms like air cover, contributed to the scene of Soviet tanks littering the battlefields, even if they made it that far at all. Thus, the apparently staggering German successes, often highlighted by the sheer number of Soviet tanks destroyed, can be better understood as a disaster waiting to unfold for the Soviets. Inept planning and direction within the Soviet military profoundly affected the outcome, as the large quantities of outdated equipment inflated the perception of German victory. In reality, even without the specific blunders committed by the Soviets, the great bulk of their mechanized army was likely to struggle against the German forces. Yet, what was fundamentally crucial for the future of the conflict was the production of new and more effective tanks. In this regard, Soviet leadership acted with notable resolve. Amid the relentless advance of the German forces, the gigantic evacuation of Soviet industry to the east in 1941 became essential for ensuring the economic resilience of the Soviet Union. Undertaken with remarkable speed and under the most adverse circumstances, including aerial bombardments from the Luftwaffe, hundreds of factories were uprooted, transported deep into the interior, and rapidly reassembled. The scale and complexity of such an undertaking are hard to fathom, especially in light of the national crisis gripping the country. Here, the post-war Soviet literature’s use of grandiose terms such as "heroic" and "historic" seems justified.
Between July and November, a staggering 1,523 industrial enterprises were relocated to the Volga region, Siberia, or Central Asia, amounting to an impressive 1.5 million railway wagonloads of equipment and materials. More remarkably, production of vital war materials actually increased in the latter half of 1941, with official production figures for items like tanks being exceeded. Indeed, the Soviet Union produced more tanks in 1941 than Germany, with 66 percent of these being the newer T-34 and KV-1 models. Additionally, Soviet industry outproduced Germany in aircraft and artillery pieces, effectively meeting the immediate needs of the Red Army. In assessing the outcome of Germany’s first major encirclement battle on the Eastern Front, it becomes apparent that the German military leadership overestimated the ramifications of their victories on the Soviet Union’s ability to maintain a coherent front. Conversely, the Germans failed to effectively balance the demands of securing a tight perimeter around the eastern edge of their encirclement with the necessity of swiftly capitalizing on their successes by continuing their advance. The root cause of this oversight, evident even in the early stages of the war, lay in a shortage of sufficient mobile forces needed to accomplish the tasks at hand. Consequently, as losses mounted and the campaign expanded toward more ambitious objectives over vast distances, the specter of over-extension loomed ever larger.
These massive numbers represented just the initial wave of mobilization for the Soviet Union. In 1941, the nation had a staggering population of 198 million people, in sharp contrast to Germany, which had a population of only 79 million. Furthermore, the average age of the German population was generally older than that of the Soviets, giving the USSR a significant advantage in recruitment. This demographic disparity meant that the Soviets had access to a larger manpower pool to fulfill the country's diverse needs, ranging from labor in mines and factories to soldiering in the armed forces. The effectiveness of this mobilization was clearly illustrated by the force generation numbers achieved by the Red Army thus far in the war. In July alone, the Red Army managed to field an impressive thirteen new field armies. Many of these soldiers were little more than inexperienced conscripts at the outset of their service, yet as they engaged in combat, they accumulated invaluable experience, both individually and collectively as units under fire. Meanwhile, the leaky encirclements during the intense battles of June and July allowed numerous soldiers to return to the Red Army as veterans, bolstering its ranks with combat-experienced troops. These returning veterans helped to form a critical core of experienced personnel that would prove to be vital during the grueling autumn fighting, contributing not only to the immediate military efforts but also enhancing the overall resilience of the Red Army in the face of continued German aggression.
The Wehrmacht was only beginning to encounter the early signs of the manpower struggles that would plague it throughout the remainder of the conflict. In the first weeks of fighting on the Eastern Front, the German military experienced relatively moderate casualties compared to those incurred by the Soviet Union. However, each lost soldier represented a more significant challenge for the Germans, who were operating within a smaller manpower pool. The demands of the war economy were already exceeding what Adolf Hitler and the Nazi regime could reasonably expect from the country, and domestic mobilization was essentially complete. Germany had commenced its campaign in the east with its best possible force, and it was only destined to decline from that point onward. Despite the staggering fact that more than 200 million people lived under Nazi control outside Germany itself, it would not be as straightforward as it might seem to conscript some of these millions to aid in the Nazi wars. Historically, figures like Napoleon Bonaparte had successfully enlisted tens of thousands of soldiers from across Europe during his conquests. Nazi Germany would employ small numbers of soldiers from the occupied territories as Waffen-SS units, but these numbers were never decisive and were relatively minuscule when set against the scale of the ongoing war.
To expect the Nazi regime to broadly conscript the conquered peoples of Europe for its war effort fundamentally misunderstands two key points. First, Hitler was not a leader who envisioned a benevolent or unified coalition of nations; his policy of racial warfare aimed to subjugate those he deemed the lesser races of Europe. Rather than merging the continent into a harmonious union, his ideology sought to exploit and strip-mine occupied territories to make way for the expansion of the German populace. Many citizens of these occupied nations were considered unworthy even of sustenance, let alone the privilege of bearing arms and fighting for their future. Secondly, the willingness of these subjugated populations to support Hitler’s aggressive campaigns was exceedingly low. By 1941, it was becoming increasingly evident that only total domination would satisfy the ambitions of the Nazi leadership. Resistance movements were beginning to organize in many countries, receiving support and aid from the British. Notably, by May 1941, the first British-organized resistance group had formed in France, marking just one aspect of the continent-wide resistance against the Nazis, much of which received little to no assistance from the Allies. When considering these various factors, it becomes clear that they collectively undermined the Nazis' ambitions. The Wehrmacht’s declining ability to mobilize replacements would continue to haunt the Ostheer (the eastern army) as the war progressed, leaving a lingering legacy of manpower shortages that would shape the course of the conflict.
Not to go off topic here too much, but since I am the Pacific War Channel guy, I always find it fascinating how both Japan and Germany made the same mistake when it came to incorporating foreign peoples into their service. Both had their own racial takes, for Hitler its pretty simplistic, the war in the east was one of extermination. Hitler envisioned the brutal butchering of most of the slavic people whom he considered untermenschen. Those who survived if any would have been thralls to German settlers in the east. Japan is a bit more complex. Long story short a man named Ishiwara Kanji sort of came up with a pan-asia concept that was bastardized by those like Hideki Tojo into the infamous Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. On paper this was supposed to be the incorporation of all the different Asian groups, under the leadership of the Japanese to more or less be a bulwark against western evil. In reality, many Japanese viewed other asian groups as untermenschen and sought to reign over them, rather tyrannically. The absolute horror and abuse the conquered people of Asia faced under Japan is pretty onpoint with what happened on the eastern front, although the Japanese did not establish units whose purpose was genocide. Both Germany and Japan utterly failed to enlist numerous potential peoples, because of their brutal mistreatment of them and it was to their detriment. On the eastern front there were countless people unhappy with the USSR, hell look at the Ukrainians who underwent the Holodomor. It would not have taken much to get the Ukrainians onboard, but instead of showing up as liberators the Germans unleashed brutality upon them. Likewise with Japan, many asiatic people facing western imperialism, take the Malayans or Vietnamese as an example, could have been ripe pickings to turncoat. Anyways that was my 2 cents.
The Yelna salient emerged as the focal point of attention for Army Group North as the conditions on the battlefield intensified. In the waning days of July, the Red Army escalated its pressure on the German troops holding the front line. By the time August arrived, the battle for the critical river crossing had expanded far beyond its tactical significance, morphing into a fierce contest of wills, with neither side willing to concede defeat. This struggle devolved into a desperate and chaotic flinging of troops into the breaches of the enemy lines. For hours, and often days, the artillery fire echoed across the battlefield, mixing with the sounds of conflict as each side clung to its positions. Occasional breaks in the German lines could only be patched up by hastily assembled scratch forces, scrounged from the rear areas, desperately trying to shore up defenses. Meanwhile, the main pocket at Smolensk was still under immense pressure, with the 9th Army bearing the brunt of the effort to compress this encircled area. They faced fierce resistance from the Soviet soldiers trapped within, who were proving remarkably tenacious, refusing to die easily. As the Soviets withdrew under pressure, they encountered units from the 7th Panzer Division on the eastern side of the encirclement. Typically, this situation would have favored the Germans, but the 7th Panzer was already stretched to its limits, desperately trying to defend its positions against the relentless onslaught from the Soviet 16th Army. To the north, the 19th and 30th Armies continued their assault, systematically crushing the remnants of the 39th Panzer Corps and preventing any reinforcements from reaching the critical pinch point of the pocket. Everything that Field Marshal Fedor von Bock had at his disposal was already engaged in combat or tasked with defending other vulnerable sections of the line. There were no reserves to spare. On the afternoon of August 1st, just five days after the pocket had been sealed, the German line finally broke. In response to this alarming setback, Bock immediately issued orders for the 20th Motorized Infantry Division, commanded by General Georg-Hans Reinhardt, and Guderian’s 17th Panzer Division to close the gap. However, long-simmering tensions among the commanders began to surface, culminating in a dispute over responsibility for the breakthrough that delayed their response. Neither commander was convinced that their men could handle the fierce fighting that lay ahead, a moment of hesitation that could have dire consequences for the unfolding battle. This moment stands in stark contrast to previous disagreements that had characterized the hotheaded panzer commanders earlier in the war. In the campaigns in France, officers frequently engaged in heated arguments, often driven by a fervent desire to win glory on the battlefield. These conflicts typically centered around disobeying orders, prioritizing caution, or maintaining vital lines of communication. There was no shortage of ambitious commanders eager to push their men deeper into enemy territory in pursuit of swift and easy victories, demonstrating a strong inclination to take risks and exploit any perceived weakness in the enemy.
However, as the harsh realities of warfare set in on the Eastern Front, many of the so-called "heroes" of the French campaign began to find excuses for their inability or unwillingness to take responsibility when faced with adversity. This shift highlights a significant change in the mentality of some of these leaders; rather than boldly advancing, they hesitated when the stakes were high and the situation deteriorated. Their resolve appeared to wane as the fighting intensified and the prospect of defeat loomed larger on the horizon. In essence, while the early phase of the war saw commanders eager to charge ahead, the tough conditions on the Eastern Front brought forth a different breed of leadership, marked by self-doubt and a reticence to make bold decisions. The shift from offensive bravado to defensive defensiveness underscores the psychological toll that prolonged conflict can exact on military leaders, revealing the complexities of command in the face of overwhelming challenges.
On July 30, 1941, Adolf Hitler issued a new war directive that aimed to rectify his earlier command from the 22nd regarding the division of the 2nd and 3rd Panzer Groups of Army Group Center. This earlier order had sought to redistribute panzer forces between Army Group North and Army Group South in order to secure key strategic objectives in Ukraine and Leningrad. However, that directive had faced stern opposition and sparked significant strategic disagreements among the German high command, discussions that underscored the fracturing unity within the Nazi leadership. The individual accounts of soldiers enduring the relentless hardships of the Eastern Front provide a stark insight into their torment. On June 30, infantryman Bernhard Ritter lamented that substantive rest periods were a thing of the past, which, following his “strenuous battles,” he declared were “urgently necessary.” On the same day, another soldier, Harald Henry, wrote home detailing a grueling march of 44 kilometers, during which he engaged in battle and was ordered to carry a 14-kilogram ammunition box cross-country for nearly three hours. He conveyed his exhaustion in poignant terms, stating, “I was completely worn out, exhausted to the last reserve.” Just four days later, Henry expressed the terrible strain he was under after another march of 45 kilometers. His letter painted a vivid picture of their suffering: “We’re wet through all over; sweat is running down our faces in wide streams – not just sweat, but sometimes tears too, tears of helpless rage, desperation, and pain, squeezed out of us by this inhuman effort. No one can tell me that someone who isn’t an infantryman can possibly imagine what we’re going through here.”
Alexander Cohrs, in his diary entry on July 1, recounted the grim toll of their relentless march, reporting the loss of three men from his company, one of whom had died. He noted that these losses were “not as a consequence of battle, but from exhaustion resulting from the exertions.” Cohrs reflected on the physical and mental rigors they faced during their journey, concluding somberly: “Towards the end, when one is fighting painfully against collapse, one occasionally hears words of suicide.” Helmut Pabst voiced his frustration, commenting, “This marching is more strenuous than action.” Another infantryman, marching with Army Group North, described slipping into a state he labeled a “quasi-sleepwalk.” He explained how he became entranced by the steady rhythm of the marching boots in front of him, only momentarily waking when he stumbled into the body ahead.
The adjutant to the divisional commander of the 7th Panzer Division recalled after the war that during the initial weeks of Barbarossa, the “inhuman hardships” faced by the infantry evoked feelings of sympathy among the higher ranks. Heinrich Haape vividly captured the dire conditions of their march: “With dry, cracked lips, red eyes, and dust-covered faces, the men marched eastward with only one wish – to lie down for a few hours’ rest. But the march continued relentlessly over roads and tracks, through woods and open fields. Each man’s war at this stage was circumscribed by the next few steps he would take, the hardness of the road, the soreness of his feet, the dryness of his tongue, and the weight of his equipment. Beckoning him on was the thought of the next halt. Just to stop, to have no need to put one foot in front of the other for a few hours, was the dream of every man.” While the experience of marching presented its own agonies, Haape also alluded to a more grueling fate for many infantrymen, the so-called “push commandos.” Two or three sections from each company were selected for this task, specifically assigned to support the heaviest wagons in the supply train. Haape explained the ordeal:“As soon as a wagon slowed down, the men would spring forward, grab the spokes, and throw their weight forward to keep the wheels moving. The men stripped off their tunics and shirts, with sweat pouring down their backs as the red dust settled on them and caked hard. One squad would be relieved from its push commando duties by another and would find blessed relief in marching.”
A new directive clarified that both the 2nd and 3rd Panzer Groups should be withdrawn from the front lines for a vital ten-day rest period. The directive to delay the operations was intended to provide the Panzers with a crucial opportunity for refitting before they were dispatched to assist their comrades in Army Group North and Army Group South. Specifically, Panzer Group 2 was slated for transfer to Army Group South to facilitate the capture of Kyiv and the destruction of all Red Army units positioned west of the Don River. This ambitious undertaking aimed to secure a decisive victory in Ukraine, but Hitler viewed it as a task no more daunting than what Army Group Center had previously achieved with two panzer groups during their swift advance across France. Meanwhile, Panzer Group 3 was designated to support Army Group North in its operations directed toward Leningrad. Significantly, the directive made no mention of capturing the city itself; instead, Hitler had already determined a strategy centered on starving Leningrad into submission through a protracted siege. This approach reflected a shift in tactics, prioritizing attrition over rapid conquest, and underscored the evolving nature of the German strategic perspective as they faced fierce Soviet resistance. This pause was intended as an opportunity to recuperate the fatigued troops, repair the damaged tanks, and resupply their units in anticipation of future operations. Unfortunately, regardless of Hitler's intentions or the tactical rationale behind this order, it starkly highlighted the disconnect between Hitler and the military realities faced by his commanders on the ground. At this critical juncture, there was simply no possibility to pull back the Panzers. They were deeply engaged in fending off a massive Soviet counter-offensive while simultaneously struggling to maintain control and contain at least nine intact divisions that were trapped within the now-opened Smolensk pocket. The urgency of the situation required immediate attention and decisive action, but the order for a rest period reflected a dangerous naivety that could jeopardize the entire operation and leave German forces vulnerable to encirclement and further attack.
As July came to a close, Army Group North found itself grappling with the challenges of organizing a proper assault on Leningrad. The widening funnel shape of the front was most acutely felt in the northern sector, where Field Marshal Wilhelm von Leeb commanded the smallest army group. His forces were contending with some of the roughest terrain along the Baltic coast, complicating their operations further. As early as the middle of July, senior German officers had recognized the problems of the advance. On July 16th, Hoepner wrote to his wife that “The deciding cause remains our weakness...The number of divisions is as inadequate as their equipment....The men are tired, the losses increase, the fallout rate of vehicles rises.” While the Soviet Northwestern Front had initially surrendered the border areas without much resistance, their resolve began to stiffen as they approached Leningrad. In the previous week, we witnessed how General Vasily Vatutin decisively ravaged Manstein’s 56th Panzer Corps, signaling troubling times ahead for the soldiers of Army Group North. However, at that moment, they were engaged in cleanup operations in Estonia, trying to sort out their logistics as they awaited the arrival of the 3rd Panzer Group, which was finishing off the remnants in Smolensk after completing its own refit period. While the 3rd Panzer Group was already supporting Army Group North with the 57th Panzer Corps, commanded by General of Panzers Kuntzen, it remained under the nominal control of Army Group Center. They were primarily focused on securing that army group’s flank, but this fighting served as a prelude to the eventual subordination of the 2nd Panzer Group to Army Group North, an essential step for Leeb to feel secure enough to launch a full-scale offensive on Leningrad. Since the middle of July, Velikiye Luki had become the center of a protracted battle. The fighting around and for Velikiye Luki is often overshadowed in narratives of the Eastern Front due to the simultaneous massive encirclement battles at Smolensk and Uman. However, it is essential to recognize Velikiye Luki for its strategic value and the stiff resistance offered by the Soviet forces. The town's possession was crucial for the Germans as it secured the flank of Army Group North at Smolensk, preventing potential vulnerabilities that could be exploited by Soviet counteroffensives. Furthermore, Velikiye Luki served as an important waypoint for Army Group North as they redirected their efforts northward toward the assault on Leningrad. Capturing this town was not merely about immediate tactical gains; it also represented a broader strategic maneuver that facilitated the planned advances in the ongoing campaign, demonstrating the town's significant role in the larger operational framework of the Eastern Front. At times, it involved several divisions, and by the first week of August, General Hoth was beginning to concentrate all available forces to secure the area. Although it would still be a few weeks before he could initiate his attack, Hoth spent the initial week attempting to pull his men out of the line in Smolensk, rest and refit them, and progressively move them up to prepare for the impending assault at Velikiye Luki.
For the rest of Army Group North, the tactical plan for the assault on Leningrad was nearing completion. Air reinforcements were committed to the area, including the 8th Air Corps, which had been re-tasked from Army Group Center to bolster the aerial support for the operation. Alongside the 3rd Panzer Group, which was also receiving a much-needed rest period during the first week of August, there was hope that these reinforcements would provide the necessary strength for a decisive final push against the Soviet positions. At this stage, there were no immediate plans to launch a direct assault through the city itself; the initial objective was to encircle Leningrad. The timing of the decision to besiege the city remained somewhat fluid, as the orders directed at this point focused on encircling it. Presumably, the final decision on how to approach an assault could be made later, after the city was fully surrounded. With these strategic adjustments, Army Group North was tasked with executing two main thrusts. The principal effort would be spearheaded by three task forces, constructed primarily from the 18th Army and the 3rd Panzer Group, which would attack along a wide front stretching roughly three hundred kilometers between the Narva River and Lake Ilmen. This coordinated advance aimed to penetrate Soviet defenses and secure critical positions around Leningrad. Simultaneously, a smaller secondary attack was planned to take place south of Lake Ilmen, involving the entirety of the 16th Army. This dual approach aimed to exert pressure on multiple fronts, maximizing the chances of breaking through Soviet lines and setting the stage for a successful encirclement of the city.
The three task forces of the main effort were organized into northern, central, and southern groups, each with specific objectives aimed at enveloping Leningrad. The northern group, commanded by General of Panzers Reinhardt, included the 41st Panzer Corps and the 38th Infantry Corps from the 18th Army, led by General of Infantry Chappuis. Their objective was to launch an offensive across the Luga River with the goal of capturing the town of Kingisepp, thereby securing a critical position in front of Leningrad and facilitating further advances. The central group was to consist solely of Manstein’s Corps, which was tasked with taking Luga and subsequently attacking Leningrad from the south. This focused effort aimed to create a breakthrough that could lead to encirclement and cut off the city from reinforcement and resupply. The southern group of the main effort was responsible for advancing through to Novgorod and eventually isolating Leningrad from the east. To achieve this, the group was composed of two infantry corps from the 16th Army: the 28th and the 1st Infantry Corps. Their coordinated assault was designed not only to push towards Novgorod but also to establish a stronghold that would further restrict Soviet movements and logistical support to Leningrad. Together, these task forces represented a concerted effort to surround and subdue Leningrad, leveraging the strengths of both panzer and infantry units to overcome Soviet defenses and initiate the siege.
South of Lake Ilmen, the 16th Army had been significantly reinforced with the attachment of the 22nd and 50th Corps drawn from Army Group North and the OKH Reserves, respectively. These reinforcements joined forces with the 2nd and 10th Infantry Corps, collectively forming a robust attack force aimed at pushing eastward to drive back the Soviet armies in that sector. Their main objective was to create a buffer zone essential for the encirclement of Leningrad. Opposing them were the combined forces of four Soviet armies: the 11th, 22nd, 27th, and 34th Armies, all of which occupied well-prepared defensive positions along the crucial rail line connecting Moscow to Leningrad. This rail line was vital for Soviet logistics and troop movement, making the task of breaching their defenses even more challenging for the Germans. The first week of August was critical for Army Group North as they worked to get their forces into position for this massive attack. It was a true all-or-nothing assault; the need for success was paramount. Field Marshal Wilhelm von Leeb had committed his entire Army Group to this operation, leaving no strategic reserves to call upon in case of setbacks. The only support available were three lightly equipped security divisions designated to hold the rear. However, security divisions were not intended for front-line combat and lacked the necessary support and firepower to withstand prolonged engagements in the heat of battle. Leeb understood that he had to make the attack succeed with the forces at hand; failure to do so could jeopardize not only the assault on Leningrad but also the overall strategic position of the German forces in the Eastern Front.
During a visit by General Paulus to Army Group North on July 26, the armored commanders of Panzer Group 4, including Generals Hoepner, Manstein, and Reinhardt, all reached a consensus that the terrain between Lake Ilmen and Lake Peipus was ill-suited for armored warfare. This assessment, coupled with the unyielding resistance from Soviet forces, led Field Marshal Wilhelm von Leeb to deem the continued advance of Manstein’s 56th Panzer Corps as “very unfavorable.” In contrast, General Reinhardt’s 41st Panzer Corps was in a slightly better position, though it was momentarily halted and had incurred heavy losses.Confronting these significant challenges, Manstein bluntly communicated the situation to Paulus: “I informed him about the battles we had fought to date and emphasized how run down our panzer corps had become in an environment that was most unsuitable for the use of armored troops. The losses among our corps’ three mobile divisions had already reached 6,000 men, and both the troops and their equipment were under excessive strain. I told Paulus that, in my view, the most sensible course of action would be to withdraw the entire Panzer Group from an area where a rapid advance was nearly impossible and redirect it toward Moscow.”
Unlike his decisive influence in shaping German strategy in 1940, Manstein found himself without direct access to Hitler and faced the daunting task of arguing against Hitler's entrenched ideas rather than supporting them as he had in previous campaigns. One individual who emerged as an indispensable ally to General Halder in advocating for a shift in focus to Moscow was General Alfred Jodl. While the extent of his influence is difficult to measure, Jodl’s support for the Moscow campaign was significant, not only because of the arguments he presented but also due to the weight of his office. The rivalry between the OKW and the OKH added credibility to their collective cause as they found themselves aligned in their views, rather than competing for Hitler’s favor. The only exception was Keitel, who, due to his loyalty to Hitler, refrained from involving himself in the dispute except to relay the generals’ complaints to the Führer. Predictably, Keitel's own position was never in doubt, largely because of his notorious fidelity to Hitler, which also meant that his opinions were seldom sought.
In Warlimont’s account, Jodl was depicted as a pivotal figure in Hitler's headquarters, advocating for the OKH’s position. The opposition to Hitler’s strategy had transformed into a unified chorus among key figures in the OKW, the entire OKH, and nearly all relevant field commanders. During scheduled discussions or in private moments with Hitler, Warlimont claimed that Jodl “found a soft spot and seized the opportunity to advocate for an attack on Moscow.” This confrontation took place on July 27, when Jodl presented arguments centered not on the strategic value of capturing the Soviet capital, as Halder had stressed, but rather on the belief that the remaining strength of the Red Army had to be confronted and defeated at that critical location. This approach cleverly echoed Hitler’s own reasoning that the enemy must be destroyed wherever they were found. In typical fashion, Hitler countered with his familiar arguments, highlighting the economic importance of securing the Ukraine and Caucasus regions. Nevertheless, Jodl’s vocal intervention proved a crucial element in the debate. “On the following day,” Warlimont noted, “probably due to the weight of new unfavorable situation reports coming in from Army Groups Centre and North, he [Hitler] suddenly seemed prepared to abandon his large-scale operations in the south.” The extent of Jodl’s influence in swaying Hitler’s decision remains uncertain; however, he undeniably provided an influential voice against the prevailing strategy.
The effect of the ongoing debate on Hitler was not always evident behind his steely demeanor in daily situation reports and unequivocal language towards the generals. Nevertheless, the burden of indecision about how to proceed weighed heavily on him. On July 28, during a brief walk with his army adjutant, Major Gerhard Engel, and his chief military adjutant, Colonel Rudolf Schmundt, Hitler shared rare insights into his private thoughts. Engel later recounted that Hitler confided he was losing sleep at night because he was “not yet clear about some things.” He revealed he felt torn between political objectives and economic goals within the Soviet Union. Politically, he felt compelled to capture Leningrad and Moscow; yet economically, securing Lebensraum in the south “where honey and milk flow”, was crucial. The following day, July 29, during a visit to Panzer Group 2, Schmundt conveyed to Guderian that Hitler’s indecisiveness regarding the war’s direction persisted. The three objectives under consideration, Leningrad, Moscow, and the Ukraine,vied for attention, but according to Schmundt, no final decision had been made. In his memoirs, Guderian asserted that he had urged the case for Moscow to Schmundt “with all the force of which I was capable.”
Looking south, the Uman encirclement, which had been the primary objective of Army Group South during the last two weeks of July, was finally completed. However, the mere accomplishment of encircling enemy forces did not signify the end of the battle. Similar to the situation at Smolensk, the Red Army was not prepared to surrender easily. Although the Wehrmacht had successfully surrounded them, the Soviets took this as a cue to intensify their resistance. The fight to eliminate the remnants trapped in the Uman Pocket continued into the first week of August. The Soviet 6th and 12th Armies, crucial ground forces in the region, found themselves unknowingly divided from one another. This disconnection significantly hampered their coordination as each army struggled to navigate back towards reunion. While the 6th Army attempted to push eastward, the 12th Army sought a route south. In a concerted effort, General Kleist’s panzers collaborated closely with the infantry divisions of the 6th and 17th Armies, as well as the Hungarian mobile corps. This synchronization allowed them to effectively isolate and crush the Soviet forces as they desperately sought a way to escape from the encirclement. By August 7, the battle was decisively over. The Red Army had officially lost two field armies in these encirclement battles spanning July and into early August. In the aftermath of the fighting around Uman, the Germans recorded over one hundred thousand prisoners taken. Many of these men faced uncertain futures, as they were destined to be sent westward to become prison laborers. They would contribute to the war effort by aiding the production of weapons intended for the very invasion of their homeland.
On the left flank of Army Group South, General Reichenau’s 6th Army was positioned somewhat south of Kyiv, tasked with securing the Army Group's left flank. With new Soviet field armies being mobilized to reinforce the Southwestern Front, Reichenau maintained vigilance while his comrades focused on the ongoing battle at Uman. Among these new formations, the 37th Army stationed at Kyiv posed a significant threat, yet Reichenau had only one infantry corps available to counter it. Meanwhile, the 5th Army, under Major General Potapov, was positioned to the southwest of Kyiv, where Reichenau was deploying two infantry corps to maintain the defensive line. In Moscow, Stalin, through the Stavka, was vocally chastising individual field army commanders for their performance. This was characteristic of the dictator’s style in the early part of the war, though he came to allow the chain of command to work in the later years of the war. Hitler was much the opposite, as the war dragged on, he displayed less respect for the military hierarchy, often ordering corps or division commanders personally.
He demanded that the 5th Army launch an offensive against the flank of Army Group South to provide assistance to the 6th and 12th Armies besieged at Uman. Although it was too late to salvage the situation by midweek, Potapov reluctantly obeyed the orders and initiated an attack. However, after several days of heavy fighting, the offensive was called off, resulting in substantial Soviet losses without any meaningful gains. Adding to the Soviet woes, the German 17th Infantry Corps successfully captured Korosten, marking a significant setback and a further embarrassment during an already disastrous week for the Soviet war effort in Ukraine. As the sun set on August 7, the outlook was grim across the Eastern Front, potentially for both sides. While Smolensk had been forced back open, the costs in men and material had been staggering. It was becoming increasingly clear that the Germans would soon succeed in closing the pocket around the encircled Soviet forces. The liquidation of the 6th and 12th Armies in the region further highlighted the dire situation for the Red Army. Moreover, Vatutin’s recent successes in the north, although initially promising, were likely to attract more German attention to his sector. As preparations for the next phase of Operation Barbarossa got underway, cities like Leningrad, Kyiv, and Moscow braced for the impact of the German advance, aware that the coming days would likely bring renewed onslaughts from the Wehrmacht.
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Despite encircling Smolensk, Soviet forces regrouped, showcasing resilience. As casualty numbers soared, the illusion of swift German victory faded. They struggled with stretched supply lines and manpower shortages while the Soviets rapidly mobilized new divisions. Notably, as the Germans pushed toward Leningrad, their strategy faltered amid heavy losses. The chaotic battles revealed the stark reality of war, behind every German triumph loomed a growing Soviet spirit, destined to reshape the Eastern Front and alter the course of the conflict.
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